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Pan-European technology-related programmes certainly 
have an important role to play in the movements’ towards 
continental integration in the coming decade. Of particular 
importance, according to those evaluation reports which are 
currently available (1), has been the experience of undertaking 
oe collaborative R&D between what: in many cases has been up to five 
_—_ Pd , or six firms, research institutes and universities in two or more 
a x to eu CA countries on any single project. The already high and increasing 
ene Ly , o4 costs of R&D in high technology industries has forced European 
Bata 10 see RE ) countries into the realisation that they cannot compete 
internationally on their own. ; These experiences in collaboration, 
  
eel = 032080°% 25 and contacts made between firms that previously were little more 
a WS ZO I than brand-names to each other, are now recognised as being as, 
. if mot more, important than any of the actual products which 
i Ce 7 might be forthcoming from such joint ventures. So successful have 
WERK S wi these experiences been that they are now being reproduced outside 
TD NB the institutional framework of EEC programmes. 
But these programmes, in spite of their heavy resource 
allocation, address the problems of only a small number of firms 
in a narrow range of industries throughout Europe. Without 
wishing to denigrate the economic and political importance of 
such initiatives, their primary contribution is to strengthen the 
  
FICHA CATALOGRAFICA high-technology supplying firms. They cannot solve the problems 
Faced by the vast majority of companies in Europe that arise from 
Rian, Howard the changing nature of international competition. 
Manufacturing strategies and government poli- The competitive situation in which the majority of 
cies./Howard J.Rush.-Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/IEI, manufacturing firms now find themselves is by now. well 
wild, documented. Regardless of the source of the intensification of 
a (Texto para Discussdo, IEI/UFRJ, compe kat tons customers increasingly require (and are in a 
+187). 4 amt to insist upon) high quality, more consistently 
|. produtos Manufaturados - Indistria. 2. Po- reliable, products and better delivery performance. These and 
; 5 . cde EE Gerdes other non-price factors listed in Table 1 add to the constant 
litica Industrial. 4 pressure on firms to produce to a suitably low price in order to 
capture and defend market share (2).     
Table 1: Pressures on Firms 
- strong pressure on price to reduce or at least 
maintain at low levels 
- increasing emphasis on non-price factors, such as design 
and quality 
- increasing demand for customer service before, during 
and after sales 
- greater customisation of products, more variety and 
differentiation 
~ shorter product life cycles to cater for markets w
ith 
an increasing ‘fashion’ orientation 
- increasing pressure on short delivery response times 
Source: Bessant J, and Rush H, (1987) "Integrated Manufacturing", 
Centre for Business Research, Brighton Polytechnic, a report to 
UNIDO, to be published in the Technology Trends series. 
These pressures compound the normal problems of rising 
costs of input such as labour, materials and energy. As a means 
of providing greater variety in products with more frequent 
modifications or to meet the demands for customer specific 
service, firms are finding it necessary to become more flexible. 
This flexibility also extends to the need to 
cope with 
fluctuations in demand, as well as being able to offer a 
wider 
range of products and the capability to use the 
same item of 
capital equipment for more than one product 
(3). 
Increased flexibility requires manufacturers 
to solve 
problems ranging from high inventory 
levels, long lead times and 
high overhead costs. The list of such problems, 
shown in Table 2, 
will be familiar to any manufacturer and are not restricted to 
those working in batch-production sectors. Similar pressures 
have 
hohevoluse nn the manufacturing spectrum to mass-assembly and 







capital-investment in dedicated equipment, 
and employment 
practices based on the theories of Ford, 
Taylor and Sloan 
dominated manufacturing strategies. With these 
strategies, there 
has traditionally been a trade-off between produ
ctive efficiency 
and flexibility. They have become increasingly ina
ppropriate in 
conditions where market pressures are forcing 
firms to find 
alternative ways of producing with both high flex
ibility and high 
productivity. 
Table 2: Problems Restricting Flexibility 
- low machine utilisation (due to set-up times for 
different batches) 
-queueing problems at key bottleneck o
perations 
through which all products must pass 
— low machine utilisation due to queueing upstream
 and 
waiting downstream of bottleneck operations 
-high inventory levels of naw materials, 
work-in-progress and finished goods 
- long production lead times 
- poor production monitoring and control 
- high overheads in indirect staff engaged in trying to 
monitor and expedite orders 
- poor delivery performance 
- poor quality 
- inefficient use of space 
- overloaded paperwork systems 
Source: Bessant J, and Rush 4H, (1987), "Integrated 
Manufacturing" aper prepa : series. » Paper prepared for the UNIDO Technological Trends
Technological Approach 
For a growing number of companies the central feature 
of their new manufacturing strategies has been the introduction 
of a powerful range of new technologies based on programmable 
automation which have become available during the last decade. 
These new technologies range from simple microelectronic controls 
to rather more complex systems for computer-aided design, 
flexible manufacturing systems, robotics, automated handling, 
test and warehousing facilities and the like. Their rate of 
diffusion has been breath-taking. A three-country comparative 
survey conducted in 1983 indicated that process applications of 
microelectronics in industry had reached 43% of manufacturing 
firms in West Germany, 43% in Britain and 35% in France (4). In 
the UK, a country not noted in recent times as having the most 
innovative industries, the diffusion of microelectronic process 
applications has grown from 18% in 1981 to 49% in 1985 (5). 
Studies of the diffusion of discrete pieces’ of 
automated technologies show that the installed base of 10,000 CAD 
systems in 1982 grew to 42,000 in 1985 (6). In the UK alone, 32% 
of those firms which had adopted some form of 
microelectronic-based equipment were using CAD by 1985 (7). For 
FMS's, which represent only 2-3% of the global machine tool 
market (8), sales more than doubled between 1982 and 1984; over 
1000 FMS systems are now installed worldwide (9). The diffusion 
of industrial robots in nine ogcp countries increased at a rate 
of 44% per annum between 1974 and 1984 (10). Within individual 
countries the stock of robots grew at varying rates. In Japan, 
for example, a stock of 65,000 robots in 1984 increased to 93,000 
in 1986, a rate of 52%. In the UK and the USA the growth rates 
were lower at 8,5% and 27% respectively. 
Rates of diffusion alone do not, however, tell 
anything about the benefits of the technologies to individual 
firms or the problems that arise in their application. For this 
we must rely on case-studies of individual firms and sectoral 
Studies: only a small number of the latter are presently 
Beye Data from case-studies show that it 
isn't unusual for 
Sean poets to report increases in productivity of nearly 
¢ ¥ of the clothing sector found more modest but 
us 
none-the-less significant improvements of 4-6% in material 
savings and an average of 50% reductions in lead time (11). An 
in-depth study of fifty FMS user firms in S8ritain reported 
reductions in lead time by an average of 74% and in 
work-in-progress by 68%, and an increase in machine utilisation 
by 63% (12). 
It would be possible to continue quoting this type of 
statistic at some length, but it is not my intention here to sing 
the praises of any particular technology. Indeed, it is widely 
accepted that regardless of how powerful each discrete automated 
technology may be, their 'real' benefits only appear with the 
converge of the technologies and the subsequent integration of 
activities within the plant. Nevertheless, studies clearly 
indicate that these technologies - even at the individual level- 
can address some of the problems currently facing manufacturers. 
Sufficient examples have now been recorded of programmable 
technologies permitting more rapid changeover of plant, reducing 
lead times, producing higher quality, etc. The fact that these 
technologies can help does not, however, mean that they always 
do. Just as a selective presentation of either anecdotal evidence 
or the more systematically collected data can imply that these 
technologies are a panacea for industrial woes, they can also be 
employed to argue the opposite. Significant difficulties exists, 
which intensify as higher levels of integration are attempted. A 
recent study of 250 firms in the UK sounds an important note of 
caution (13). It reports, as illustrated in Table 3, that of 
those plants which have invested in FMS over two-thirds have 
experienced low paybaks while nearly half of the CAD users found 
returns less than initially expected. 
Table 3: Payoffs from Advanced Manufacturing Technologies 
(sample: 250 firms) 
Technology Zero-Low Payoff Moderate - High Payoff 
(%) (%) 
CAD 46 54 
CAM 46 54 
MRP 19 81 
FMS 67 33 
Robots 76 24 
Source: New C, (1986), Manufacturin i Operations in t British Institute of Management/Cranf he UK, 
ield University,
To some extent, the more disappointing figures are a 
result of firms not being sufficiently far along on the learning 
curve. Many users of CAD, for example, suggest that it takes up 
to two years before they are experienced enough to use _ the 
equipment to anything approaching its full potential (14). In 
other cases, the choice of technologies have been inappropriate 
because of lack of information or understanding on the part of 
management. Sometimes the machines have performed as intended but 
antiquated accountancy procedures, which expect short-term 
returns on investiment, are inadequate since they fail to take 
into account the full long-term benefits of the technologies. Few 
of the more traditional accountancy systems, for example, take 
into consideration the ability to enter new markets, or an 
increase in market share which might result from reduced lead 
times or more customised production. Simple return-on-investment 
techniques are only just now being replaced by more complex 
alternatives which incorporate the strategic issues facing firms. 
It is mot possible here to discuss all of the 
difficulties facing firms in adopting advanced automated 
technologies. In addition to those already discussed, these 
difficulties also include technological problems related to 
integrating different elements, and a lack of in-house skills and 
resources. Elsewhere we have outlined a long-term strategic 
approach for the adoption of automated technologies which argues 
for an incremental, step-by-step progression towards higher 
levels of integration of manufacturing activities (15). The 
approach we favour allows for organisational learning and the 
acquisition of skills while keeping investment and risk at an 
acceptable level during the early stages. But in our research we 
have found that in nearly every case, successful technological 
change cannot be accomplished without some degree of 
organisational change as well - what in the innovation literature 
is referred to as the ‘compatibility’ between the innovation and 
the context into which it is being placed. In some cases we have 
even found that organisational changes introduced as a prelude to 
the introduction of advanced automation has resulted in such 
Significant reductions in inventories, shorter lead times and 
Higher quality that the adoption of the technologies has become unnecessary (16). 
Organisational Approach 
As one manager in a recent study succiently put it 
"computer integration into a chaotic situation results in 
computerised chaos". The elements of organisational innovation 
required can range from the need for functional integration to 
reduce the traditional problems of inter-departmental boundaries 
through to vertical integration with shorter and flatter 
hierarchies resulting in a devolution of decision-making. But 
perhaps most significant, has been the changing nature of work 
organisation - the greater reliance on small autonomous groups of 
workers and managers, which reduces task fragmentation, highly 
specified division of labour, and external control and regulation 
(17). 
One of the most powerful arguments in support of the 
need for organisational change has been the success of many 
Japanese firms, and the subsequent adoption by an increasing 
number of non-Japanese enterprises, of a Tange of 
organisational/managerial techniques. These include 
‘just-in-time! production, total quality control, closer 
user-supplier relationships. Central to these techniques (some 
would say philosophies) is the better use of existing resources - 
the workforce itself - to generate and implement solutions to a 
Firm's problems within a context of long-term continous 
improvements. 
Just as with advanced automated technologies, the 
selection of appropriate organisational techniques is not subject 
to a universal formula but is dependent on the needs and 
resources of the individual firm. The direct benefits have been 
clearly demonstrated in the area of inventory saving, reduction 
of work-in-progress, increased quality, faster through-put, space 
savings, reduced scrap, and arguably, improved worker motivation 
(18). 
The route to successful use of such techniques is not 
however, a simple matter. While we categorically reject eli 
scp ta ahamees argument that Japanese success in applying these 
organisational techniques is culturally determined, we also do 
mot accept the alternative extreme - that they are ‘plug-in!
solutions. As with the advanced automated technologies, 
successful use of any of the forementioned techniques must be 
part of an overall strategy which aims at streamlining, 
simplication of operations, and the integration the design and 
manufacturing process. Fundamental to _ this approach is’ the 
acceptance of the importance of human rather than technological 
capital (19). Those firms - Japanese or otherwise - which have 
successful adopted these methods have done so over a long peri
od 
of time. But to receive the full benefits which they have to 
offer requires both management and the workforce having
 to pay 
more than mere 'lip-service' to the concepts of participation 
and 
consultation. Use of these techniques as a means of further
ing 
management control of the rate of work or as a means
 of 
circumnavigating the legitimate rights 
of worker representatives 
will lead to increased resistence 
to their diffusion (20). For 
their part unions must also 
accept the changing face of 
manufacturing and re-think traditional 
approaches to securing 
worker benefits. 
The Role of Governments 
Whether one adopts the organisation
al techniques for 
the benefits they provide or as 
a necessary prelude to the 
introduction of advanced automated techno
logies, there is the 
need for planning within a framework t
hat links the business 
strategy to the resources available to 
the firm, with an 
understanding of the technological and organis
ational options, 
and the requirements of implementation. 
Clearly, many large 
organisational already have the resour
ces to undertake the 
strategic planning necessary for future 
success. But just 4s 
clearly, many firms do not. With 
the proliferation of choice of 
new technologies and techniques, many 
firms are at a loss a5 to 
which would be the most appropriate, considering
 the combination 
of resources available and problems faced. A questio
n that is 
increasingly posed is what role, if any, can governments 
realistically play in assisting firms in making the transiti
on 
between the old and new industrial paradigms. 
Penge Slee nO pop iuce vy c
isREne** 
pe have come to remarkably similar conclusions 
during th 
9 the 1980s. By this I am not referring to the high profile 
pan-European programmes. Potentially more 
important have been a 
series of national programmes aimed at 
increasing the awareness 
of individual firms to the capabilities of 
new technologies, 
providing financial assistance to user 
firms who wish to develop 
their own applications, and building a national i
nfraestructure 
for technical assistence. 
The focus of most of these programmes is to 
increase 
the rate of diffusion of microelectronic-ba
sed applications in 
both manufacturing processes and products.
 They go under names 
such as the Microelectronics Applications 
Programme (MAP) in the 
UK, the Special Programme on the Application of
 Microelectronics 
(SAM) in West Germany, the Technological Develop
ment Programme 
(TOP) in Denmark, Products Using Electronic Compone
nts (PUCE) and 
Application of Computer-controlled and 
Automated Production 
Equipment (ADEPA) in France, and the Nati
onal Microelectronic 
Programme (MNP) in Sweden. 
Naturally, each programme has its own 
distinctive 
administrative arrangements and differing degr
ees of financial 
assistance that are tailored to its perce
ived strengths and 
weaknesses, to market requirements, industri
al structures, and 
laws regulating competition in each country (21). I 
have selected 
the UK's MAP scheme for illustration; it was one of th
e first, 
the longest running, and one of the most successfu
l, programmes. 
Initiated in 1978 by the then Labour government, the scheme was 
extended under the Conservative administration. Divided into 
three separately-administered parts, the scheme had a strong bias 
towards educating firms on the potential of microelectronics
, 
allowing them (many of which had never undertaken any form of 
R&D) to engage in learning-by-doing, and developing a network
 of 
experienced consultants to undertake fleasibility studi
es for 
firms. 
Part A of MAP covered awareness and training and inclu- 
ded materials (videos, published literature, etc.) and speakers 
for in-firm presentations, subsidised by the Department of Trade 
and Industry. Short-courses for managers were organised through 
existing educational and training institutions with equipment and 
course-development paid for by the government (firms paid the 
fees for their managers). One of the most creative parts of this
10 
scheme was a train rented from British Rail which travelled the 
country filled with demonstration applications for commuters to 
see (22). 
The second part of the scheme, entitled MAPCON, 
provided financial support to meet the cost of hiring consultants 
to assist the firms in undertaking short feasibility studies. 
Consultants who qualified for the scheme were listed in a booklet 
which specified their industrial and technical expertise. The 
government paid for up to ten days of the consultants time. This 
was sufficient for a study of potential applications (process or 
product) and an outline of the resources which would be required 
if the firm chose to procede into development. At the height of 
the scheme's popularity, over 100 applications for assistance 
were being received monthly and 800 consultants were 
participating. Between 1979 and 1985, nearly 7,000 applications 
had been received and over 4000 studies completed, costing the 
government 9.5 million pounds sterling. The programme was aimed 
at small to medium sized firms. Of those receiving support, 
nearly one-third employed less than 50 people and only 8% 
employed more than 1000. Consultants registered under the scheme 
came from a wide variety of institutions, ranging from private 
consultancy companies through to university and polytechnic 
engineering departments. While a large number had little 
previous experience with microelectronic applications in 
industry, the scheme provided a low-risk means of providing 
experience (ie. at little or mo cost to the client firm). 
Administratively, the scheme was unemcumbered by bureaucracy. 
Application to the scheme was simple (a two page form) and 
rejection criteria almost non-existent. In the period during 
which the scheme was in heaviest demand, only six civil servants 
were require to process applications and assess whether the terms 
of the contract between clients and consultants had been 
fulfilled. In our evaluation of the scheme, we concluded that it 
had been a nearly unqualified success in both educating firms and 
contributing to a mational capability for technical assistence 
(23). 
The third, and largest, part of the scheme (Part C) was 
for development support in the form of grants of between 25% and 
33% towards the costs of R&D. Entry into the scheme was somewhat 
ll 
more demanding, with applicants required to provide details of 
financial and human resources, a business plan, the expected time 
schedule and costs of development. Naturally, since more public 
monies were being spent, closer attention was paid to the ability 
of firms to complete the projects (24). Nearly 250 civil servants 
were required to process and act as project officers for the 
nearly 2,500 firms which applied (of which 55% received support) 
during the period of our evaluation (1979-1985). The composition 
of firms participating were again biased towards the small and 
medium sized, and the majority of projects cost less than 250,000 
pounds sterling. 
We were not able to evaluate MAP in terms of financial 
returns since many projects were still underway or not on the 
market for a sufficient period of time to reach firm conclusions. 
However, when compared to a sample of firms who had undertaken 
projects outside of MAP, we found that only 11% of MAP projects 
were eventually abandoned, compared to 23% of those outside of 
MAP. Over 50% of MAP projects proceeded into commercial 
production, against 33% for non-MAP projects. 82% of the firms 
Participating in MAP considered that they had successfully met 
the necessary technical specifications (against 60% for non-MAP 
firms). More MAP-participating firms reported a greater degree of 
increase in market share, spin-off products, and the acquisition 
of in-house expertise (25). At a cost of only 5-10 million pounds 
sterling a year (26), MAP helped a significant number of firms to 
take their first steps up the learning curve of efficient use of 
microelectronics. 
As mentioned above, other European countries have 
addressed the same objectives with Programmes differing more in 
terms of degree than substance. Perhaps the most significant 
difference was the decisicn in Denmark and Sweden to enhance 
their technological infrastructure through government support of 
networks of private, non-profit technological institutions which 
could carry out R&D, consultancy, training, testing, etc. Another 
important difference has to do with the way in which schemes were 
administered, with West Germany, for example, using its 
engineering association rather than a government department to 
run their programme.
12 
Relevance for Developing Countries * 
Whether one refers to these sorts of programmes as 
interventionist or merely ‘creating the environment! which 
allows the market to operate, is largely irrelevant outside of 
politically ideological considerations. More important is whether 
or not there are elements of these schemes that could be adopted 
universally or improved upon. With the assistance of UNIDO, a 
team of civil servants in Venezuela, clearly believe that this is 
the case (27). Having studied the different instruments and 
mechanisms employed in such programmes, the Venezuelan government 
is expected soon to embark on their own distinctive programme. 
Recognising that microelectronic-based applications alone will 
not solve the problems facing firms, they have developed a 
programme which spans the new technologies while encompassing the 
new organisational techniques. 
Central to the Yenezuelan modernisation programme is 
the concept of the "innovation consultant". These individuals, 
skilled in using the diagnostic tools for analysing firms main 
problem areas quickly and knowledgeable on the potential of the 
new technologies and techniques, will act as ‘marriage brokers' 
between the firm and those individuals within the country with 
the expertise necessary to undertake a full feasibility study and 
the application of the chosen solution. 
The skills required for such a program are, not 
surprisingly, in short supply. As a prelude to a full programme, 
training courses for innovation consultants are required as is an 
expansion ‘of the in-country expertise on areas ranging from 
low-cost CAD systems to just-in-time production. The government, 
through established organisations such as COVEP (the productivity 
council), will train and help establish a registry of 
consultants, develop awareness programmes using successful local 
firms as demonstrators, and establish an information centre for 
interested cliente (28). Interest in this programme has quietly 
spread and a fund of one million dollars has been designated by 
the development bank CAF for the extension of similar programs 
throughout the Andean Pact member nations. 
This type of programme sucro:- from the ineloir fact 
L3 
that results can only be expected in the medium-to long- term. 
While the potential exists to reach a large number of 
previously-negleted firms which form the backbone of any economy 
(29), this type of step-by-step ‘continuous improvement' 
Programme will take years to make a significant impact. As a 
result, the political will to support such an effort is much more 
difficult to generate than the higher-profile types of technology 
policy. All too often it is the 'sexier' short-fix solutions 
which, while lacking any track-record of substantive 
achievements, provides greater political capital in the 
short-term. It is my view that the 'nuts and bolts' type of 
technological programmes, such as that currently under 
development in Venezuela, will make a longer-lasting impact on 
industrial restructuring, regardless of geographic location. 
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for ONUDI-FOMENTO, Caracas, Febrero. The team of civil 
servants working together in Venezuela included individuals 
seconded from various government and non-governmental 
institutions in Venezuela as well as Howard Rush and John 
Bessant from the Centre for Business Research, at Brighton 
Polytechnic UK. 
Decisions on the financial arrangement for this scheme have 
yet to be finalised. Venezeulan law does not permit direct grants 
to firms but it is likely that some form of subsidy will be 
available to pay for the few days required of the innovation 
consultant per firm. Some degree of ‘'soft-loan' may also be 
possible for the full Feasibility study although the 
implementation costs are likely to be bourn by the user firm. 
-In many countries modernisation programs have been directed 
solely at larger firms in the hopes of having the greatest 
impact. The results, while at times dramatic for the 
individual firms, is often similar to the early years of the 
"green revolution’ which was Similarly biased towards larger 
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